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A salt bridge model, which takes into account mass transfer of com-
ponents between the two fluids, was developed and proved successful in
interpreting the effects of composition on explosiveness in the smelt-water
system. The model is based on the fact that the main smelt constituent, sodium
carbonate, is not soluble in water at temperatures approaching the critical
point, while certain other constituents are soluble. The soluble substances
allow a substantial increase in the critical temperature of the solution, which
in turn shifts the range of contact interface temperatures at which spontaneous
explosions can occur (between the spontaneous nucleation temperature and the
critical temperature of the coolant) to higher values. The model was able to
provide an explanation of why sodium chloride, sodium hydroxide, and sodium
sulfide act as smelt sensitizers and a semiquantitative definition of the con-
centration ranges in smelt and in the quench solution where spontaneous explo-
sions are likely.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Smelt-water explosions have been a problem in the kraft pulp industry
for a long time. It has also long been recognized that smelt composition can
have a pronounced effect on explosiveness. Sallack (1) found dissolving tank
violence to be correlated to the NaCl content in the normally Na2CO3 smelt. He
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confirmed this sensitivity in laboratory tests. Nelson and Kennedy (2) also
found that smelt composition could have a pronounced effect on explosivity in
laboratory experiments.
Following some major explosions in recovery boilers, a Smelt-Water
Research Group was set up under the auspices of the Fourdrinier Kraft Institute.
The initial study was conducted by Babcock & Wilcox and Combustion Engineering
under coordination by The Institute of Paper Chemistry (3). Subsequently work
was sponsored at Arthur D. Little and Battelle-Columbus (4). In addition to
conclusively showing that smelt-water explosions were noncombustible in nature,
laboratory explosivity tests demonstrated a marked dependence on composition of
both smelt and the quench liquid. NaCl, NaOH and Na2S were shown to be sen-
sitizers for Na2C03 smelts, while Na2SO4 and Na2CO3 themselves did not give
explosions. No satisfactory explanation of composition effects was developed,
although Battelle did note that sensitizers were compounds whose solubility in
water increased with temperature as the critical temperature of water was
approached. Thus their saturated solutions could be heated above the critical
temperature of water without reaching a critical point.
Shick (5) extended the Battelle concepts by proposing a concentration
gradient mechanism for smelt-water explosions. He stated that at the smelt-
water contact interface it is necessary to consider the mutual solubilities of
the two liquids in each other. Instead of a sharp interface between smelt and
water, there are concentration gradients on both sides with water present in
smelt and smelt dissolved in water. These concentration gradients form a "salt-
bridge" at the interface. Shick's concept provided a commonality for sensitizers
that no other theory was able to give. However, he was unable to use it to make
quantitative predictions on the effects of smelt composition on explosivity.
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Explosion Theories
Work on explosions in LNG-water systems led to the homogeneous
nucleation theory of explosions. Enger and Hartman (6) found that a necessary
condition for explosions was that the hot liquid temperature exceeds the homo-
geneous nucleation temperature (also called the limit of superheat temperature,
Tsl) of the cold liquid. This was confirmed by Porteus and Reid (7) in LNG-
water and by Henry and Fauske (8) in Freon-water and Freon-mineral oil systems.
This condition provides a lower bound for explosions. At 1 atm pressure, the
superheat limit temperature for hydrocarbons is about 0.89-0.9 times the critical
temperature. For hydrocarbon mixtures, the T 1s is closely approximated by a
mole fraction average of the TSL of the pure components.
Spiegler, et al. (8a) computed the Leidenfrost temperature (which is
almost the same as the limit of superheat temperature) by using the Van der
Waals equation of state. For simple cryogenic fluids they obtained a value of
0.844 times the critical temperature. We have calculated the limit of superheat
for water at low pressure from several equations of state and obtained values of
0.895 Tc, 0.919 Tc and 0.922 Tc from the Redlich-Kwong, Soave, and Peng-Robinson
equations, respectively. Apfel (8b) has shown that the limit of superheat for
many liquids is from 0.85 to 0.9 times the critical temperature. In this paper
we have used 0.89 Tc as the limit of superheat temperature for water and for
aqueous salt solutions.
There is also an upper limit to the hot fluid temperature above which
explosions are not probable and stable film boiling occurs instead. This limit
is less definite, but data from laboratory scale experiments indicate that a
value equal to 1.1 * Ts8 is a reasonable approximation.
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In summary, the simple homogeneous nucleation theory indicates explo-
sions may occur if
1.00 < Thot/Tsl,cold < 1.10
An equivalent statement for light hydrocarbons is
0.89 < Thot/Tcrit,cold < 0-98
It is interesting to note that the upper bound for explosions is almost
the same as the critical temperature of the cold fluid. Ochiai and Bankoff (9)
showed that film boiling becomes quite stable at temperatures higher than the
critical temperature because wetting is not possible. Swift (10) and Henry (8)
also considered the critical temperature of the coolant as the maximum value of
the surface temperature. The coolant critical temperature as an upper bound of
explosions was confirmed in many systems - light hydrocarbon-water (7), Freon-
mineral oil (8), tin-water (11) - and is consistent with experimental results in
aluminum-water (12,13) and steel-water (13).
A very different theory of these types of explosions is the detonation
model of Board (14). He applied the classical theory of detonation to the one-
dimensional case of a plane explosion front propagating through a coarsely mixed
region of hot and cold fluids. This concept has been refined into the 4-stage
model of explosions now commonly accepted. The four stages are coarse inter-
mixing, triggering, escalation/propagation, and expansion. Versions of the
4-stage model have the potential of predicting energy conversion ratios and
details of the blast wave. This is not possible with the homogeneous nucleation
model which only predicts the boundaries of the explosive region.
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Fauske (15) has proposed a criterion which can serve as a tie between
the homogeneous nucleation concepts and the 4-stage model. He suggested that
large-scale explosions only occur if the interface temperature on contact is
above the superheat limit temperature of the cold liquid. This was ration-
alized as a necessary condition for film boiling, which stabilized the system
while coarse intermixing proceeded. Large scale explosions could only occur if
there was extensive intermixing before triggering.
The simple homogeneous nucleation theory has been most successful in
predicting explosive boundaries in weakly explosive systems that are self-
triggered. It is likely that the criterion is most germane to the triggering
step. Many systems which are nonexplosive in simple contact modes have reacted
violently in shock tube experiments or when a sufficiently energetic detonator
was used as a trigger.
In this paper we will show that the effects of smelt composition on ex-
plosiveness in laboratory scale experiments can be explained by using the simple
homogeneous nucleation theory in conjunction with Shick's salt-bridge concepts.
FORMULATION OF SALT-BRIDGE MODEL
Keevil (16) presents data on the vapor pressure of aqueous solutions at
high temperature. The vapor pressure of the sodium carbonate and sulfate solu-
tions approaches that of pure water as the temperature is increased. On the
other hand, the vapor pressure of more soluble salts such as sodium chloride and
sodium sulfide (16) and potassium carbonate (17) remains below that of water as
the critical temperature of water is approached. Furthermore, their solubilities
increase with temperature so that their saturated solutions could be heated well
above the critical temperature of water without reaching a critical point. Keevil
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(16) indicated that the intermolecular forces for NaCl-water may be strong
enough to prevent critical conditions even at temperatures as high as 800°C and
pressures of 400 atm.
Since the upper bound for explosiveness is the critical temperature of
the cold fluid, it is important to find data on the critical temperature as a
function of salt concentration. Marshall (18) compared his critical tempera-
ture-composition measurements for NaCl-water with those obtained previously by
Olander (19), Sourirajan (20), and Schroer (20a). The critical temperature
increases from 374°C for pure water to 388°C for a 1% (by weight) NaCl solution,
to 424°C for a 5% solution and to 467°C for a 10% NaCl solution. Sourirajan
(20) showed critical temperatures at higher concentrations to be 600°C at 19.6%
and 700°C at 26.4% NaCl.
Urusova (21) investigated the vapor pressure of NaOH-water and NaCl-
water solutions at 350-550°C. The critical temperature of NaOH solutions increases
to 450°C at 10.3 % (by weight) NaOH, 5000C at 15.3%, and 550°C at 20%. We could
not find similar data in the literature for Na2S, possibly because it may be
chemically unstable. The sodium sulfide could form sodium hydroxide by hydroly-
sis or react with water to form hydrogen and sodium sulfate at high temperature.
The homogeneous nucleation theory predicts that explosions occur only
when the temperature at the fluid-fluid interface is between the homogeneous
nucleation temperature and the critical temperature of the coolant. The inter-
face temperature is commonly calculated from the equation in Carslaw and Jaeger
(22) for the time-independent contact temperature between two infinite slabs of
material, each initially at a uniform temperature.
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T1 = (rl*Th + Tc)/(1 + rl)
where
kh Ph Cvh 1/2
rl = c PC Cv
k, p, and Cv are the thermal conductivity, density and specific heat
capacity. Subscripts h, c refer to hot and cold phases, respectively.
When dealing with fluids which are soluble in each other, there will be
concentration gradients as well as temperature gradients, and an interfacial
concentration will be established. We define T* as the critical temperature for
the coolant at the interfacial concentration, Ci. It is assumed that the inter-
face temperature can be calculated from the conduction equation with constant
properties (the effect of mass transfer on the heat transfer is neglected). It
is further assumed that the homogeneous nucleation temperature for solutions is
also given by 0.89 times the critical temperature. Then the explosion criterion
can be written as
0.89 T* < Ti < T*
For a given interface temperature, Ti, the explosive range will be bounded
between two interface concentrations. One boundary will be the concentration
corresponding to T* = Ti. This would be the lowest interfacial concentration at
which explosions would occur. The upper bound on interface concentration would
be that corresponding to T* = Ti/0.89. Thus the criteria can be written as
C(low) < Ci 0 C(high)
where Ci is the smelt-water interface concentration.
C(low) is the salt concentration corresponding to Ti.
C(high) is the concentration corresponding to Ti/0.89.
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The interface concentration can be calculated in a manner directly
analogous to that used for calculating the interface temperature. The equation
is
Ci = (r2 * Ch + Cc)/(l + r2 )
where r2 = (Dh/Dc)
1/2
Ch = salt concentration in the smelt.
Cc = salt concentration in the bulk water.
Dc = diffusion coefficient of salt in water.
Dh = diffusion coefficient of water in salt if salt concentration is
dominant in the smelt, or diffusion coefficient of salt in
Na2C03 if salt concentration is low.
For smelt at 8000 C contacting boiling water, the interface temperature is
estimated to be 440°C. The system will be within the explosive region for solu-
tions having critical temperatures between 440 and 528°C [(440 + 273)/0.89 -
273]. The salt concentrations that correspond to these temperatures are 7 and
12% by weight, respectively.
Diffusion coefficients are needed to calculate the interfacial salt con-
centration. The diffusion coefficient for NaCl in water is 1.35E-5 cm2/sec at
18.5°C. At 150°C, the diffusivity of NaCl in water is estimated at 1.17E-4
using the Nernst-Haskell equation (23). The self-diffusivities of sodium and
chloride ion in molten NaCl at the melting point are 7.38E-5 and 5.82E-5,
respectively and increase with increasing temperature (24). The diffusivity of
water in molten LiCl-KCl eutectic mixtures was found by Melendres (25) to be
3.1E-5 and 8.0E-5 at 390 and 480°C, respectively. All of the relevant dif-
fusivities are of the same general magnitude. If they were equal, the interface
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concentration would be a simple numerical average of the salt concentrations in
the hot and cold fluids. If the hot fluid diffusivity were 1/2 of the cold
fluid diffusivity, the interface concentration would be given by Ci = 0.414 x
Ch + 0.586 x Cc. If the hot fluid diffusivity were twice that of the cold, the
interface concentration would be given by Ci = 0.585 x Ch + 0.414 x Cc. The
arithmetic average is a reasonable approximation and is used as an estimate of
the interface concentration in this paper.
COMPARISON OF SALT BRIDGE MODEL WITH DATA - EFFECTS OF SMELT COMPOSITION
The effects of smelt composition on explosivity tests under laboratory
conditions were summarized by Battelle (4) as follows:
* The major smelt constituent, Na2C0 3, was not in itself explosive.
* The likelihood of an explosion increased with increasing amounts of Na2S
in the smelt.
* Smelt containing relatively small amounts of Na2S were more easily
sensitized by the minor smelt constituents, NaCl and NaOH.
* Other minor smelt components, K2C03, Na2S0 4, and Na2SO3, in descending
order, were minor sensitizers.
All of these results were obtained in experiments in which the explosions
were self-triggered. The same is true of the dissolving tank experiments of
Sallack (1) and Nelson (2). Composition effects are much less marked when
external triggers are used. Bergman and Laufke (26) obtained explosions with
all tested smelt compositions, including pure Na2C0 3, by using detonators with a
high ignition impulse.
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Na2CO3 - NaCl System
a. Pure Sodium Carbonate
The lowest interface temperature for this system is calculated to be 524°C
for sodium carbonate at its melting point of 851°C in contact with water at
25°C. Since this lowest interface temperature is far above the critical tem-
perature of water (374°C), pure sodium carbonate will not explode spontaneously
and needs a strong external trigger.
b. Sodium Carbonate-Sodium Chloride Mixtures
The data of Sallack (1), covering the entire NaCl-Na2C03 concentration
range are shown in Table 1. Soda smelt (without sulfide), at temperatures
ranging from 1600 to 1700°F, was poured into water at 170-180°F. With smelt
containing 6% NaCl, explosions occurred in 1/3 of the tests. With smelt con-
taining 8% or more NaCl, explosions occurred in all tests. The heaviest explo-
sions were produced with smelt containing from 8 to 20% NaCl. Explosions with
smelt containing more than 20% NaCl were light, amounting to no more than the
shattering of the smelt.
The interface NaCl concentrations for the heaviest explosions are esti-
mated to range between 4 and 10%. This range agrees reasonably well with the 7
to 12% range predicted by the salt bridge theory, especially when considering
the uncertainty in the interface concentrations due to the lack of good dif-
fusivity data. It is also consistent with data from the Smelt-Water Research
Project (3) which showed no explosions at 5% NaCl and violent explosions at both
15 and 20% NaCl.
(Table 1)
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c. Pure Sodium Chloride
Nelson (2) observed violent surface interactions for pure sodium chloride
dumped into quench water. Hohmann (27) found that explosions did not occur in
flooding mode experiments without an external trigger but did occur in pouring
mode experiments with coolant temperatures higher than 50°C. At coolant tem-
peratures of 20°C, violent surface interactions prevented the penetration of
large melt masses into the coolant.
Anderson and Bova (28) did extensive experiments injecting small amounts
of water into molten NaCl at temperatures between 880 and 980°C. Tests with
water at high velocity (50 ft/sec) generated mild interactions which splashed
the smelt out of the crucible, but no large explosions. Later tests, run at
lower injection velocity, produced several violent interactions.
Anderson and Armstrong (29) found two types of behavior in their tests.
In some cases with subsurface injection and in all cases in which glass spheres
filled with water were broken beneath the molten salt surface, the water boiled
harmlessly to the surface, causing some splashing of the salt but no explosion.
Other subsurface injection tests in the same equipment gave explosions from
equivalent water masses and geometries. Subsurface movies showed that every
explosive case was initiated by an external force which tended to drive the two
liquids across the insulating vapor film into contact with each other.
The experimental evidence indicates that the NaCl-water system is not
explosive without external triggering. This is in agreement with the salt-




-The effect of sodium sulfide concentration on smelt-water explosions is
summarized in Table 2. In general, there are only mild explosions or none.at
all at sulfide concentrations below 20% by weight. Battelle (4) found that the
explosion probability ranged from 100% for smelt containing 30% Na2S down to 10%
for a melt containing 20% Na2S.
(Table 2 here)
After comparing concentration ranges in Table 2 with those in Table 1, it
appears that 1% Na2S is equivalent to about 0.36% NaCl in sensitizing explo-
sions. If so, the upper concentration boundary for Na2S should be about 35%.
Battelle (4) found that pure Na2S is very reactive with water with explosions
occurring in more than 90% of the tests. The high probability does not
necessarily mean severe explosions. The behavior of pure Na2S may be analogous
to what Sallack found with NaCl-Na 2C03 at very high NaCl concentrations.
Another factor, that could be an influence at the upper boundary, is that with
pure or mostly pure sensitizers the diffusion coefficient for water into smelt
is the relevant parameter in determining the interface concentration and not the
diffusion coefficient of the sensitizer within the molten smelt.
NaOH-Na2CO3 System
Sallack (1) found that smelt composed of NaOH and Na2CO3 exploded with
100% probability when the NaOH content was above 10% by weight. Nelson (2)
obtained consistent results in laboratory quenching tests in which there were no
explosions at 5% NaOH and violent explosions at 10 and 15% NaOH. These results
are summarized in Table 3.
(Table 3 here)
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After comparing Table 3 with Table 1 it appears that 1% NaOH is equivalent
to 0.7% NaCl in sensitizing Na2C03 smelt. If so, then the upper explosive con-
centration would be expected to be about 17% NaOH. There are some data from the
Smelt-Water Project (3) in which no explosions were produced on injection of
water into melts containing 15, 20, 50 and 100% NaOH. On the other hand, there
are several reports (2,3) of violent surface interactions of water on pure NaOH
melts.
Kraft Smelts
Kraft smelts normally consist of Na2C03 and Na2S with relatively small
concentrations of other sensitizers such as NaCl and NaOH. Data from Nelson (2)
on the effect of smelt composition in dissolving tank explosions are summarized
in Table 4. Also included in Table 4 are the calculated NaCl equivalent con-
centrations using the following equivalencies.
1% NaCl = 1.43% NaOH (1/0.7) = 2.78% Na2S (1/0.36)
(Table 4 here)
It can be seen that the lower limit for equivalent NaCl concentration is
about 7%. This is in very good agreement with Sallack's (1) results for NaCl-
Na2C03 smelts. It is also in close agreement with the predicted lower limit of
7% NaCl at the interface from the salt bridge theory.
If each of the NaCl equivalencies are divided through by the molecular
weights of the salts, the proportions become;
1 NaCl = 2.09 NaOH = 2.08 Na2S
Although these ratios may be coincidences, it is tempting to speculate that
one mole of NaCl has the same effect as a sensitizer as two moles of NaOH or Na2S.
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EFFECT OF SALT CONTENT OF QUENCH WATER ON EXPLOSIONS
It has been shown (2,3,4) that green liquor (an aqueous solution of smelt)
resulted in more severe explosions than pure water even though the salt con-
centration (excluding Na2CO3) is typically not more than 3% NaCl equivalent in
green liquor. Other data (3) showed violent explosions for smelt with 24% Na2S
quenched by 5% NaCl solution and 20% Na2S smelt quenched by 10% NaCl solution,
but 15% NaCl solution poured into smelt with 27% Na2S gave only mild pops on
each of 18 tests.
The salt bridge model can be used to explain why the dilute salt solutions
resulted in more violent explosions than the more concentrated ones. The NaCl
equivalent concentration at the interface for 27% Na2S quenched by 15% NaCl
solution is calculated to be 12.4% which would be just above the upper boundary
of 12% from the salt bridge theory. The two smelts quenched with 5 and 10% NaCl
solution have interface concentrations of 6.8 and 8.6% respectively, one of
which is close to the lower bound and the other is within the predicted explo-
sive region. Considering the assumptions made in calculating the interface con-
centrations and the theoretical explosion boundaries, one should not attach much
significance to exact numerical values. What is significant is that the salt
bridge theory does predict that there should be a range of aqueous NaCl concen-
trations in which the explosivity of the system is enhanced, and this is borne
out by the data. It is also significant that the concentration range is about
at the magnitudes where it would be expected to be from the salt-bridge model.
EFFECT OF WATER TEMPERATURE ON EXPLOSIONS
Both Sallack (1) and Nelson (2) found that the temperature of the quench
liquid, but not that of the smelt, had a major effect on explosion behavior. In
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general, the hotter the quench liquid, the less frequent and violent were the
explosions. Some smelts which gave immediate, very violent explosions in cold
water produced only mild explosions in water at 210°F. Battelle also found that
the explosion probability decreased with increasing water temperature. There
were exceptions. Nelson (2) reported "Another composition which gave an imme-
diate violent surface explosion in cold water produced a terrifically violent
deep explosion in hot quenching water. This blast, the most violent of all, was
heard more than a quarter of a mile away." Hohmann (27) also found a shift from
surface interaction to violent explosion in NaCl-water experiments when the water
temperature was increased from 20 to 50°C.
The above phenomena can not be explained by considering the interface tem-
perature alone, since it would respond to changes in either smelt or water tem-
perature. The salt bridge model can provide a qualitative explanation. In most
of the dissoving tank experiments, the salt content of the smelt is near the
lower concentration limit. The diffusion coefficient on the coolant side
increases by a factor of 3.6 in going from 25 to 95°C. This could lead to a
dramatic decrease in the interface concentration as the coolant temperature is
increased which could easily drop the concentration below the explosive range.
There are two reasons why a temperature change on the smelt side does not
have a major influence on explosions. First, the smelt side diffusion coef-
ficient temperature dependence is only about 1/3 that of the coolant side dif-
fusivity. Secondly, an increase in smelt temperature will increase both the
interface temperature and the smelt-side diffusivity. But an increase in smelt
side diffusivity will tend to increase the interface concentration which will
tend to cancel out the effect of the higher interface temperature. On the
coolant side, these two effects will be additive.
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In general, the salt-bridge model provides a very good, semiquantitative
interpretation of the effects of smelt composition on explosion behavior. The
lower concentration limit appears to be more sharply defined experimentally and
more universally obeyed. There is also, generally, an indication of an upper
concentration limit as well, but the exact boundary appears to be much more sen-
sitive to the details of the contacting process and to external events.
It is possible to interpret the explosion criterion used in the salt-
bridge model in terms of the 4-stage detonation model of explosions and this
provides further insight into the phenomena. Basically, the "explosive range"
is bounded by two temperatures. The lower temperature limit (which corresponds
to the high concentration limit) is the spontaneous nucleation temperature, a
condition for immediate boiling on contact. This establishes film boiling inde-
pendently from hydrodynamic considerations and allows the two fluids to mix
without being immediately blown apart. The upper temperature limit (which
corresponds to the low concentration limit) is the critical temperature of the
coolant. Above this temperature, the two fluids are unable to wet each other
and film boiling becomes very stable. Large impulses are needed to bring the
two liquids into direct contact.
At interface concentrations below the lower concentration limit, the
interface temperature is greater than the critical temperature and film boiling
will be very stable. This is favorable for extensive intermixing. This effect
would tend to make a system prone to a large violent explosion. However, the
very stability of the film boiling would in turn require highly energetic
triggers to start an interaction and the inability of the two fluids to wet each
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other would interfere with the fragmentation and rapid heat transfer that are
essential to the escalation step. Thus one would expect explosions to be infre-
quent and relatively nonviolent. This seems to be what is generally observed
in the smelt-water system. The lower concentration boundary seemed to be more
sharply defined and there were fewer exceptions.
At interface concentrations above the upper concentration limit, the
interface temperature would be below the spontaneous nucleation temperature and
a vapor layer would not immediately form on contact of the two fluids. The fluids
would be able to interpenetrate each other without being stabilized. Thus the
coarse intermixing stage which is necessary for a large coherent explosion would
not be able to take place to any great extent. The system would have a tendency
to experience surface interactions which would tend to blow the fluids apart
before a major interaction could take place. In effect the system would be too
unstable to allow a large violent explosion. Instead vaporization would proceed
incoherently as spatters, sizzles, etc. This also is in accord with the
experience in the smelt-water system. The upper concentration boundary was less
rigidly defined and there were more exceptions. The behavior was also more sen-
sitive to external disturbances.
It might be conjectured that the region between the spontaneous nucleation
temperature and the critical temperature is the region where self-triggering due
to spontaneous film boiling collapse is most likely. If this is the case, then
the composition effects would be expected to be most marked in simple contacting
experiments without external triggers. This also seems to be the case. The
Swedish studies (26) in which detonators were used showed much less dependence
on composition. Interestingly enough, composition effects observed in dissolv-
ing tanks at pulp mills corresponded quite closely to those found in laboratory
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experiments in which smelt was poured into the quench liquid. This suggests
dissolving tank explosions may also be easily self-triggered.
The experience of smelt-water explosions within the recovery furnace
itself is quite different. No evidence has accumulated to suggest that the fre-
quency or violence of explosions is greater for mills having high concentrations
of NaCl in the smelt or those operating at higher sulfidity (a higher concentra-
tion of Na2S). Recovery boiler explosions are also generally characterized by
delay times ranging from a few minutes to several hours between the first oppor-
tunity for water to contact smelt and the explosion. Recovery boiler explosions
are also rather infrequent. Most instances where water has an opportunity to
come in contact with smelt in a recovery furnace do not result in an explosion.
A part of this behavior is undoubtedly simply contact geometry. The molten
smelt is present on the hearth of the furnace along with a substantial amount of
frozen smelt and unburned carbonaceous char, and water entering the furnace may
not have direct access to the smelt. However, something besides access may be
involved. Perhaps large-scale furnace explosions require a fairly stable pre-
mixing period, and thus an energetic, external trigger. Perhaps the water
entering the furnace must first dissolve some of the smelt to form a green
liquor pool within the furnace before the explosive range is reached. In this
latter case, the salt-bridge model might provide some guidance.
Composition effects similar to those exhibited by smelt-water would be
expected for any system in which one or more components from one fluid are
soluble in the other. Where this is the case, it will be extremely difficult to
extrapolate results from laboratory scale tests to predict behavior in
industrial scale systems, because the laboratory scale tests are easily domi-
nated by triggering phenomena and details of the contact geometry. The lack of
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correlation between laboratory explosion tests and the experience with recovery
boiler explosions is a good example of this problem.
CONCLUSIONS
A salt bridge model, which takes into account mass transfer of components
between the two fluids, was developed and proved successful in interpreting the
effects of composition on explosiveness in the smelt-water system. The model is
based on the fact that the main smelt constituent, sodium carbonate, is not
soluble in water at temperatures approaching the critical point, while certain
other constituents are soluble. The soluble substances allow a substantial
increase in the critical temperature of the solution. This in turn shifts the
range of contact interface temperatures (between the spontaneous nucleation tem-
perature and the critical temperature of the coolant) at which spontaneous
explosions can occur to higher values. The model was able to provide a semi-
quantitative interpretation of the available data on smelt-water.
At least in the smelt-water system, laboratory scale explosion experiments
have limited predictive capability for the behavior in industrial scale systems.
Experiments without external triggers show great sensitivity to minor composi-
tion effects and to system disturbances. Experiments with external triggers
merely shift the industrial scale problem to one of trying to predict the magni-
tude of the triggering impulses. The large scale experience with smelt-water
explosions in recovery furnaces is not easily interpretable and is not in accor-
dance with the experiences in laboratory explosion experiments.
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Table 1. The Effect of Varying the Concentration of Salt in
on Laboratory Test Explosions.
the Smelt
Number Percent
Percent of Tests of Tests
Percent Sodium Number Causing Causing
Salt Carbonate of Tests Explo- Explo-






















































































Table 2. Effect of Sodium Sulfide
Explosions
Concentration on Laboratory Test






















Table 3. Effect of Sodium Hydroxide Concentration on Laboratory
Test Explosions (1,2)





10.0 25 Violent Deep
12.0 100
15.0 100 Very Violent Deep
100.0 100 Violent Surface
Table 4. Effect of Smelt Composition on Dissolving Tank Explosions
Smelt Composition (wt.%)
Na2S NaCl NaOH Explosion Result NaCl Equivalence
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
2
0
1
2
0
None
None
Mild
Violent Deep
Violent Deep
Violent Deep
Violent Deep
Violent Deep
4.60
5.20
6.16
6.98
7.58
7.58
8.28
8.88
8.9
8.9
15.2
15.5
15.5
19.1
19.1
19.1
